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Abstract. Memorable words have become a common technique in on-
line banking security as a second authentication factor that is partially
resistant to observation by adversaries. We formally model this technique
and analyze the expected number of observations until the memorable
word is known, for a range of common word lengths. We also calculate
the probability of an adversary successfully passing authentication with
knowledge of some but not all characters from the memorable word.
1 Introduction
Online banking and other websites requiring a high level of security have adopted
several layers of authentication. One common authentication layer is the use of a
“memorable word”. This memorable word is a short password (usually assumed
to consist of a single word). However, where the memorable word differs from a
password is in how it is used; rather than entering the memorable word in its
entirety, the user is instead prompted to enter a small number of characters from
the word, typically three. The characters to be entered differ every time the user
is prompted to enter them.
The main benefit of this scheme is that it prevents an eavesdropper from
determining the memorable word by observing a single authentication session.
This means that such an eavesdropper will only have a small chance of success-
fully authenticating as the user, despite having received all of the information
used at the client side in the authentication.
We model such a scheme and analyze its security by considering two metrics;
the expected number of sessions that must be observed to get a particular sized
subset of the letters of the memorable word, and the probability of a challenge
containing only the letters of that subset. This analysis shows that an eaves-
dropper requires relatively few sets of login data to be able to authenticate with
high probability.
We begin by presenting our assumptions and formal model in Section 2. This
is followed by a probability analysis using this model in Section 3, and a small-
scale experiment to test the likelihood of one of our assumptions against a real
banking website in Section 4. We then survey related work in Section 5, before
discussing the conclusions of this work in Section 6.
2 System Model
Memorable word authentication uses a simple scheme. The client and server
both know a short password of length m characters that has been shared out-
of-band. During authentication, the server sends a unique numbers between 1
and m to the client. The client responds with the character at each of the cor-
responding positions in the password. If all of these characters are correct then
authentication succeeds, otherwise it fails.
An eavesdropper is assumed to be able to view the numbers sent by the
server, the characters sent by the client and whether the authentication was
successful or not. The eavesdropper is not able to modify the numbers sent by
the server in any way.
We begin by making two key assumptions.
1. The server chooses the numbers randomly.
2. There is no structure to the memorable word that will enable the eavesdrop-
per to guess it from a partial set of characters.
We note that the second assumption is likely to be untrue in many practical
cases. However, when the second assumption is true, this is the worst case for
the eavesdropper, and hence our analysis will give an upper bound for the number
of authentications the eavesdropper must observe.
The first assumption may or may not be true for any given memorable word
authentication system. However, again when it is true this is the worst case for
the eavesdropper. If certain characters are more likely to occur then they will be
both more likely to be observed in any given authentication, and more likely to
occur when the eavesdropper later tries to authenticate to the server. We also
present evidence that this assumption appears to hold for one major banking
website in Section 4.
We then produce the following formal model to encapsulate the key charac-
teristics of this interaction. We consider a game with two players, the adversary
and the ring master. The ring master begins the game with two parameters a
indicating how many characters are to be requested in a challenge, and m indi-
cating the length of the password. The adversary begins the game with an array
of m Boolean values set to false. The adversary can issue the following queries:
– Observe: The ring master chooses a unique integers between 1 and m and
returns each of these integers to the adversary. The adversary examines the
Boolean array, and sets each position corresponding to a received integer to
true.
– Authenticate: The ring master chooses a unique integers between 1 and m
and returns each of these integers to the adversary. The adversary examines
the Boolean array and if every position corresponding to a received integer
is true then the adversary wins the game. Otherwise the adversary loses the
game.
We can then use this model to produce two key metrics: The expected number
of observe queries needed to have n true values in the Boolean array (which
corresponds to the number of authentications that must be eavesdropped upon
to discover n characters of the memorable word) and the probability of the
adversary winning if there are n true values in the Boolean array.
3 Probability Analysis
We first consider the case where the memorable word is 15 characters long and
3 characters are chosen for each authentication. This corresponds to the game in
Section 2 with m = 15, a = 3. The first observe query is guaranteed to give three
numbers whose value in the array is false. The next login may give us either the
same three numbers, or 1, 2 or 3 numbers that correspond to a false value in the
array. We make the following definition:
Definition 1. The probability of moving from having x true values to having y
true values by issuing one observe query is denoted p(x→ y)
These probabilities can be calculated in the following way:
p(x→ y) = 0 ∀x, y, x > y
p(x→ x) =

0 x < 3
x
15 × x−114 × x−213 3 ≤ x ≤ 15
0 x > 15
p(x→ x+ 1) =

0 x < 3
x
15 × x−114 × 15−x13 × 3!2! 3 ≤ x ≤ 14
0 x > 14
p(x→ x+ 2) =

0 x < 3
x
15 × 15−x14 × 14−x13 × 3!2! 3 ≤ x ≤ 13
0 x > 13
p(x→ x+ 3) =

0 x < 3
15−x
15 × 14−x14 × 13−x13 3 ≤ x ≤ 12
0 x > 12
p(x→ y) = 0 ∀x, y, x < y + 3
These values allow us to generate the following probability matrix for moving
from any number of true values to any other number of true values by issuing
one observe query:
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
3 1455
36
455
198
455
44
91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 4455
66
455
44
91
33
91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 291
100
455
45
91
24
91 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 491
27
91
216
455
12
65 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 791
24
65
28
65
8
65 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 865
28
65
24
65
7
91 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1265
216
455
27
91
4
91 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2491
45
91
20
91
2
91 0 0
11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3391
44
91
44
455
4
455 0
12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4491
198
455
36
455
1
455
13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 286455
12
35
1
35
14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45
1
5
15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
We can then use Absorbing Markov Chain techniques to calculate the ex-
pected number of observe queries until we have all 15 true values as 15.35.
We then consider the probability of an attacker successfully answering the
challenge with less than 15 true values.
Definition 2. The probability of the adversary winning the game by issuing an
authenticate query when the Boolean array contains x true values is denoted p(x)
These probabilities can be calculated in the following way:
p(x) =
x
15
× x− 1
14
× x− 2
13
3 ≤ x ≤ 15
We note that these probabilities are the middle diagonal in the matrix above.
We then generalized this probability analysis for games with any m, a values
as follows:
p(x→ y) = 0 ∀x, y, x > y
p(x→ x) =

0 x < a∏z=a−1
z=0
x−z
m−z a ≤ x ≤ m
0 x > m
p(x→ x+ b) =

0 x < a∏z=a−b−1
z=0
x−z
m−z
∏z=b−1
z=0
m−z−x
m−z−a+b × a!a!(a−b)! a ≤ x ≤ m− b
0 x > m− b
p(x→ y) = 0 ∀x, y, x < y + a
p(x) =
z=a−1∏
z=0
x− z
m− z a ≤ x ≤ m
We present in Table 1, the expected number of logins needed to determine each
number of characters, and the probability of only known characters appearing
in a challenge for that number of characters. We present in Table 2, the same
data for the case where a memorable word of the minimum length 8 characters
is chosen. Finally, in Table * we present a comparison of the expected number
of logins until all characters are known as memorable word size varies, with the
number of characters requested staying constant at 3.
Table 1. Character Probabilities (15 Character Word)
Characters Expected Logins Probability of Only Known Characters Appearing in Challenge
3 1 0.0022
4 2.00 0.0088
5 2.08 0.022
6 2.54 0.044
7 3.20 0.077
8 3.68 0.12
9 4.38 0.18
10 5.15 0.26
11 6.08 0.36
12 7.24 0.48
13 8.79 0.63
14 10.96 0.8
15 15.35 1
Table 2. Character Probabilities (8 Character Word)
Characters Expected Logins Probability of Only Known Characters Appearing in Challenge
3 1 0.018
4 1.02 0.071
5 2.31 0.18
6 3.13 0.36
7 4.29 0.625
8 6.59 1
4 Experimental Analysis
We made the assumption in Section 2 that the characters to be input are selected
randomly by the website. We also noted that when this assumption fails, the
system’s security will be worse than when it holds, allowing our analysis to be
used as an upper bound for the effort needed by the adversary.
Table 3. Expected Logins Until All Characters Are Known
Word Length Expected Logins
8 6.59
9 7.80
10 9.05
11 10.33
12 11.65
13 12.99
14 14.37
15 15.35
Despite this general applicability of the model even when the assumption
doesn’t hold, we decided to experimentally evaluate whether random selection
is used by a major UK bank. This evaluation would both give us an indication
as to whether random selection is used in the banking industry in general, and
provide information about how to apply the model in further work concerning
that particular bank.
We performed a small scale experiment to determine if the character selec-
tions performed by the Lloyd’s Bank website were random (as in our model) or
biased in some way. This experiment was performed by starting login attempts
for Lloyd’s Bank accounts belonging to the authors and recording which char-
acters were requested by the website. The experiment did not require the use of
any unauthorized actions against the website, or any account not belonging to
the authors.
We performed 50 login actions and the combination of positions for each
of these 50 logins were recorded. The account used a 10 character memorable
word (since changed to avoid leaking any information about the authors’ bank
accounts in this paper).
The frequency with which each combination occurred was calculated. No
combination occurred more than 3 times, and the probability of a combination
occurring three or more times from a random selection was calculated as 0.279.
Hence, this experiment gives us no reason to assume that biased selection is
used, and instead fits what we expect from a random selection.
5 Related Work
The security of online banking has been studying extensively [2,3,4] , but to the
best of our knowledge no analysis of the security of memorable words has been
performed. The formal model that we use to evaluate memorable word security
is inspired by a common modeling technique used to analyze authenticated key
exchange protocols [1].
6 Conclusion
We have shown that memorable word authentication mechanisms can be ex-
pected to fail when a relatively small number of authentications are observed by
an attacker. However, for common memorable word lengths between 8 and 15
characters, the expected number of observations until all characters are known is
between 6 and 16, a significant improvement over the single observation needed
to discover a traditional password.
Whether this improvement has an actual security benefit depends on the
way in which the bank account is used, and the way in which the adversary is
observing the authentications. A customer who uses an online bank account once
a month will be given several months of extra security beyond that given by a
traditional password, and during that time the method used by the adversary to
observe the authentications may be discovered. On the other hand, an account
that is used several times daily will not be given much additional security against
a well concealed piece of malware logging authentications.
The relationship between word length and the number of observations also
suggests a benefit to users in choosing longer words, assuming that such words
can be chosen in such a way as to resist guessing from partial information (e.g.
memory schemes where a word is made from the first characters of a word in an
easily memorable phrase).
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